Posts Tagged With: Granicus

The Battle of the Granicus River

Posted on July 1, 2014 by M J Mann

Daily Diodorus
Vol. VIII. Book XVII Ch. 19-21 (Loeb Classical Library)
Read the other posts in this series here

The Headlines
Macedonians and Persians Clash
Black Cleitus Saves Alexander’s Life
Persian Cavalry Routed
Undefended, Persian Infantry Crumble
Alexander Wins First Major Battle of Reign

The Story
Learning of the satrapal army’s approach, Alexander ‘advanced rapidly’ to the Granicus River where he set up his camp on the opposite bank to the Persians. At this point, the satraps had the advantage: Alexander would not only have to cross the river to meet them but climb up the bank on the opposite side before doing so. This would be sure to put the Macedonian phalanx into disorder and make Alexander’s men easy pickings.

Or so you would have thought. At dawn the next day, Alexander lead his men across the river and not only managed to scramble up the bank but was able to deploy it ‘in good order’ before [the Persians] could stop him’.

Now faced with an organised Macedonian army, the satraps deployed their cavalry at the front of their own line. Here is how satrapal army lined up:

Left Wing (flank to centre)

  • Memnon and Arsamenes - each in command of his own cavalry
  • Arsites - in command of the Paphlagonian cavalry
  • Spithrobates - in command of the Hyrcanian cavalry

Right Wing

  • Median cavalry - 1,000 in number / commanded by ?
  • Rheomithres - with 2,000 horse / in command of ?
  • Bactrian cavalry - 2,000 in number / commanded by ?

Centre

  • Various ‘national contingents’

Numbers

  • Cavalry 10,000+
  • Infantry ‘not fewer than’ 100,000

NB The question marks regarding the right wing commanders reflects the fact that I am not clear about what Diodorus is saying here. It may be that Rheomithres was in charge of the Medes and Bactrians but that isn’t the impression I get when I read his text (see below).

We come now to the battle itself. I have broken it down into the following parts to make writing, and - hopefully - reading about, it easier. Do feel free to let me know if you find this arrangement useful or not.

One The Persian and Macedonian cavalry ‘joined battle spiritedly’. Diodorus singles out the Thessalian cavalry for praise. Under the command of Parmenion, it ‘gallantly met the attack of the troops posted opposite’.

Two Alexander, leading ‘the finest of the riders on the right wing’ charged at the Persians and inflicted ‘substantial losses upon them’.

Three The satrapal army ‘resisted [the Macedonian attack] bravely. Spithrobates, Darius’ son-in-law, threw himself at the Macedonians ‘with a large body of cavalry, and… forty companions, all Royal Relatives of outstanding valour’.

Four Seeing the success of Spithrobates’ attack, Alexander turned to meet him.

Five Spithrobates saw Alexander coming and saw an opportunity to end the menace of the Macedonian king once-and-for-all. He threw his javelin at him. It pierced Alexander’s shield and ‘right epomis’ and ‘drove through [his] breastplate’. This sounds serious. The Footnotes tell us, however, that according to Plutarch, Alexander wasn’t injured. Alexander shook the javelin off and drove his spear into Spithrobates’ chest. This movement caused both armies to cry out ‘at [his] superlative display of prowess’.

Six The movement was not a complete success, though. The point of the spear broke and the length recoiled in Alexander’s hand. Spithrobates ‘drew his sword and drove at Alexander. Fatally for him, he was not quick enough. Alexander ‘recovered his grip’ upon the spear and thrust it into Spithrobates’ face.

Seven Spithrobates fell to the ground. Just then, Spithrobates’ brother, Rhosaces, rode up behind Alexander and brought his sword down on the king’s head with such force that ‘it split his helmet’. Despite this, Alexander’s only physical wound was ‘a slight scalp wound’. Before Rhosaces could strike him again, Cleitus the Black ‘dashed up on his horse and cut off the Persian’s arm’.

Eight Diodorus now reports that Spithrobates’ companions, the Royal Relatives, threw their javelins at Alexander. Somehow, he managed to survive this deadly shower and the Relatives next, close-up, attack. Not without harm, though, Diodorus says Alexander suffered - ‘two blows on the breastplate, one on the helmet, and three on the shield’ it being the shield he had taken from Athena’s sanctuary. Back then, things were clearly made to last!

Nine Diodorus now lists some of the Persian commanders who died during the battle. They included Atizyes, Pharnaces (Stateira I’s brother), and Mithrobuzanes who commanded the Cappadocian cavalry contingent.

Ten With ‘many of their commanders’ dead and ‘all the Persian squadrons… worsted’ the Royal Relatives fled from Alexander. Seeing them retreat, other cavalry officers followed them. From what Diodorus says it seems that the flight of the Relatives allowed Alexander to claim the credit for being the ‘chief author of the victory’ in the whole battle (Do you remember how - in Book XVI Ch. 86 - we saw Philip II claim the victory at the Battle of Chaeronea after he put the Athenian-Boeotian soldiers to flight, despite the fact that the real damage had already been done by Alexander?). Diodorus also singles out the Thessalian cavalry again for praise.

Eleven Despite the route of the cavalry, the battle was not over yet. It soon would be, though, for the Persian soldiers were no match for the Macedonian phalanx. As Diodorus notes, they were also rattled by the cavalry’s retreat.

Twelve By the time that the Persian infantry was put to flight, the satrapal army had lost ‘more than ten thousand’ men. ‘[N]ot less than two thousand’ cavalry officers were killed, and 20,000 prisoners taken.

Thirteen Following the battle, Alexander ‘gave magnificent obsequies to the dead, for he thought it important by this sort of honour to create in his men greater enthusiasm to face the hazards of battle’.

Fourteen From the Granicus River, Alexander then marched through Lydia, taking over Sardis. Perhaps having heard of the Macedonians’ success at the Granicus River, Lydia’s satrap, Mithrines, gave up the city, its citadels and their treasuries without a fight.

Comments
If you are familiar with the other Alexander historians, specifically Arrian, you might have noticed that Diodorus gives a different time for Alexander’s crossing of the Granicus. He has it happening at daybreak on the day after the Macedonian army’s arrival at the river; Arrian, on the other hand, places it in the late afternoon on the day of their arrival.

Diodorus doesn’t explain how on earth the Persians allowed the Macedonians not only to make a successful crossing of the river but make their way up the bank and form up, afterwards. Either he is incorrect regarding what happened or the Persians were negligent. The former is more likely the case as Arrian describes the Persians attacking the Macedonians from the get-go, and his source was someone who was there.

Regarding my uncertainty over who was in charge of the cavalry divisions on the Persian right wing, here are Diodorus’ own words, ‘The right wing was held by a thousand Medes and two thousand horse with Rheomithres as well as Bactrians of like number’.

In the last post we saw that there was rough agreement between our sources over the size of the Macedonian army. This is not the case in regards its Persian opposite. Here are the figures quoted by the Footnotes:

  • Justin 600,000
  • Arrian 20,000 foot, 20,000 horse

There is surely an extra zero or two in Justin’s figure.

During the course of his career Alexander sustained numerous injuries but never came as close to death on the battlefield as he did at the Granicus River. As for Black Cleitus - his timely arrival would not only have implications for Alexander’s life but the spread of Hellenism across the world. If we were compiling a top ten of historically influential Macedonian commanders his intervention here would surely be Number One. In my opinion, the only other officer to come close to him is Ptolemy, for his building of the Museum of Alexandria and the role of the Library (e.g. in the translation of the Septuagint and its patronage of great scientists and writers), but if Rhosaces had landed his blow and killed the Alexander, Ptolemy would never have become king of Egypt in the first place.

Diodorus omits to mention how many Macedonian soldiers died in the battle. The Footnotes give us the other historians say.

  • Justin 9 foot, 120 horse
  • Plutarch 9 foot, 25 horse
  • Arrian 20 foot, 60 horse

Well. All I can say is if Macedonian casualties were really that low then the army was in inspired form that day. Staying at the bottom of the page, the Footnores also give the other historians’ figures for Persian casualties.

  • Plutarch 20,000 foot, 2,500 horse
  • Arrian 1,000 horse + ‘most of the Greek phalanx’ minus 200 who were captured

I’m a little surprised by how quickly Diodorus moves on from the battle. In one line, Alexander is performing his ‘magnificent obsequies’ the next he is on the way through Lydia. If Alexander took the Persian camp maybe Diodorus omitted that on the grounds of repetition - Alexander would do the same to greater effect after Issus (which we will come to in Ch. 35)

Classifieds
Wanted - Darius. Dead or Alive.
Wanted - A new army. Contact Babylon ASAP
For Sale - Persian Hopes. Going Cheap

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Plutarch at the Granicus

Posted on February 28, 2014 by M J Mann

Before beginning his Life of Alexander, Plutarch warns us that he is not concerned with the ‘great exploits and battles’ of the Macedonian king but rather ‘those details which illuminate the workings of the soul’. He can hardly ignore the great moments of Alexander’s life, though… or can he? Let’s find out by looking at his account of Alexander’s four great battles. If you are already familiar with Plutarch’s account, you may want to skip forward to ‘Some Thoughts’ below.
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The Battle of the Granicus River
In chapter 15 of the Life Plutarch tells us that when Alexander left Macedon his army was between 30,000 - 43,000 infantry and 4,000 - 5,000 cavalry in size. We must get used to these figures as he does not provide any more ahead of his account of the Battle of the Granicus, which begins in chapter 16.
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According to Plutarch, ‘Darius’ generals had gathered a large army’. When Alexander arrived at the Granicus, however, it was not the size of the Persian force that alarmed ‘[m]ost of the Macedonian officers’ but ‘the depth of the river and… the rough and uneven slopes of the banks on the opposite side’.
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Tradition was also on the mind of some of his officers for it was not the Macedonian custom to wage war in the current month (Daesius). According to Timothy E. Duff in his Notes, Daesius was roughly our May/June and the custom ‘may have’ arisen out of ‘the need to gather the harvest’. Alexander dealt with this objection by declaring the new month to be the last one (Artemisius) repeated.
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The issue of the month was not the only objection that Alexander had to deal with. The Macedonians arrived at the Granicus late in the day and Parmenion, not unreasonably, counselled against attempting a crossing at such an hour. Alexander was having none of that, though and ‘declared that the Hellespont would blush for shame’ if he held back now.
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Reservations and objections dealt with, Alexander plunged into the river with thirteen cavalry squadrons. Despite the swiftly running water and Persian missiles raining down on him the king and his men made it to the opposite bank - ‘a wet treacherous slope covered with mud’ - where they engaged the enemy.
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Plutarch tells us that as the horsemen fought one another, Alexander was picked out by ‘many’ of the Persian cavalry ‘for he was easily recognizable (sic) by his shield and by the amazingly tall white feathers which were fixed upon either side of the crest of his helmet’.
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The Persians’ attention was not in vain. As the battle raged, Alexander was struck by a javelin. Fortunately, it only pierced the joint of his breast plate rather than him. However, when a Persian nobleman named Spithridates struck him on the head with his sword - splitting the helmet and ‘grazing’ Alexander’s hair - it must have looked like his life was about to come to an early end.
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Fortunately, just as Spithridates raised his sword for the coup-de-grace, Black Cleitus ran him through with his spear. For his part, Alexander killed another Persian named Rhoesaces with his sword. It seems that his helmet not only saved his life but stopped him from being stunned.
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The Macedonian phalanx now made it across the river. Its presence made the difference. Plutarch says that ‘[t]he Persians offered little resistance, but quickly broke and fled’. The rout was not total, however; Darius’ Greek mercenaries - as well trained and disciplined as the phalanx - stood their ground. The mercenaries asked Alexander for quarter. ‘[G]uided by [his] passion’, however, he refused to give it and led a charge against them. During this battle, Alexander lost his horse to a spear thrust.
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Plutarch puts the Persian losses a 20,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry. As for the Macedonians, he cites Aristobulos who says they lost only 34 men, of whom 9 were members of the infantry. Timothy Duff notes that, according to Arrian, Macedonian losses were ‘somewhat higher’ and that 25 men died in the initial charge. Turning to Arrian, I note that he says (in addition to the 25) ‘rather more’ than sixty cavalry were killed. I am not sure what he means by that. He is more specific in regards infantry saying that ‘about’ thirty died.
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However many Macedonians died, both Plutarch and Arrian agree that Alexander honoured his dead (in part or whole) by ordering his official sculptor, Lysippos, to make bronze statues of them.
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Having paid his respects to the Macedonian dead, Alexander turned to Greece. He was ‘anxious’ for the Greek poleis to share in his victory so had 300 Persian shields sent to Athens with the famous inscription, ‘Alexander, the son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Spartans won these spoils of war from the barbarians who dwell in Asia’. Other plunder - luxury items - was sent to his mother in Macedon.
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Some Thoughts
Plutarch’s account of the battle at the Granicus, its lead-up and aftermath, is very brief and focuses on key moments, which may be summarised, thus:

  1. The Macedonian officers’ reaction on arriving at the river
  2. Alexander Crosses the River
  3. The Persian and Macedonian cavalry engage
  4. Black Cleitus saves Alexander’s Life
  5. The Macedonian Phalanx’s arrival
  6. The Greek Mercenaries’ Last Stand
  7. Alexander honours the dead

Having said that, there is certainly enough here for us to make the following observations.
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Plutarch gives us a fascinating insight into the mind of the Macedonian officers before the battle. And while I can understand why they were worried by the strength of the river and the ‘rough and uneven’ bank on the far side, the idea that they shouldn’t fight because it was the wrong month takes more getting used to. What we appear to be seeing here is a tradition that had lost its reason for being and now got in the way of legitimate progress. When I put it that way it does not seem so alien a moment, after all.
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The other thing that jumps out at me is how quickly the battle concludes. I am guessing this is because the Persians fought in a loose and fundamentally disordered fashion, which was never going to be strong enough to resist the phalanx’s tight formation and superior weaponry (i.e. the sarissa). I can’t wait to read Arrian’s account of the battle for more details.
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What might we say of Alexander? At first glance he comes across as thoroughly impatient in his desire to fight the battle and reckless for crossing the river before his men are ready join him. Is it really impatience, though, if you arrive at the battlefield, and - believing your men to be ready to fight - decide to get on with it?
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As for his recklessness, well, he did not cross the river alone and it is not as if he did so intending to fight the entire Persian army. He must have felt that he had a good chance of cutting into it, if not defeating it, before the rest of his cavalry and infantry arrived. Alexander did not have a death wish.
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So, for patience and recklessness could we not read confidence? After all, it is not as if Alexander was not capable of being patient and careful when need be. A case-in-point would be when he offered Thebes terms in 335 B.C. rather than just go straight ahead and attack the city (See Plutarch, chapter 11).
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The other aspect of Alexander’s character that Plutarch draws out is his ruthlessness in dealing with the Greek mercenaries. Not even I can justify that. The battle was won. Giving the mercenaries quarter would have been not only a merciful act but also a politically clever one.
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Finally, when Alexander sent the 300 shields back to Greece he was surely referencing the Spartans’ last stand at Thermopylae. If so, he was surely engaging in a very sly piece of historical revisionism - giving the shields to Athens makes it seem (to me, anyway) like he was crediting the Athenians for what Leonidas, his men and allies did rather than the Spartans.

Categories: Plutarch | Tags: , , , , , , | 2 Comments

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